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Abstract —The deployment of police super-recognisers (SRs) 
with exceptional face recognition ability, has transformed the 
manner in which some forces manage CCTV evidence. In 
London, SRs make high numbers of suspect identifications, 
sometimes of suspects in disguise. In two experiments 
measuring immediate and one-week memory of faces in 
disguise, SRs were more accurate and confident than controls 
at correctly identifying targets, and ruling out faces not seen 
before. Accuracy and confidence were highest when targets 
wore no disguise, followed by hat and plaster, sunglasses, and 
balaclavas respectively. Even in the balaclava condition, SR 
performance was more accurate than chance. These findings 
join an accumulating body of empirical evidence 
demonstrating that SRs possess wide-ranging enhanced face 
processing abilities, and their deployment should complement 
ever improving computerised face recognition systems.    
 
1. Introduction  
 
The study of super-recognisers (SR) who possess 
exceptional face recognition ability [1-8], has enhanced 
knowledge of the wide ability spectrum in the population. 
Interest in SRs, in the top 1-2% of ability, is driven by 
policing and security implications. Following the 2011 
London Riots, SR police identified a third of the 5,000 
convicted rioters from CCTV [9]. A full time London police 
SR unit was also established, substantially enhancing 
suspect identification rates [4, 5, 8]. Superior face 
processers also work in passport offices, complementing 
face recognition algorithms in identifying fraudulent 
applications [e.g. 10]. A large body of research aims to 
improve face recognition algorithms and develop security 
systems that best interact with human operators. Parallel 
research on SRs is essential, as future identity decisions may 
be made by machine-human combinations. Understanding 
the limits of SR abilities will therefore assist face 
recognition algorithm developers.  
Not surprisingly, disguise reduces human and computer 
face recognition accuracy [e.g., 11], and yet London rioters 
were often disguised with only the eyes visible. Other cues 
(build, clothing, gait) may facilitate identification, and some 
rioters, tracked through different CCTV camera feeds, were 
videoed removing disguises. Sometimes, the disguise was 
never removed on camera.  
Identified suspects are mainly familiar to police SRs, 
and not surprisingly, familiar faces are better recognised 
than unfamiliar faces, which theories suggest are processed 
using different cognitive mechanisms [12, 13]. Unfamiliar 
face identification is in contrast unreliable [14, 15], yet most 
London SR Unit identifications are of unfamiliar suspects, 
matched across different crime footage.  
Familiar face recognition mainly draws on internal 
features (eyes, mouth), whereas external feature extraction 
(face shape, hairstyle) drives unfamiliar face recognition 
[16], explaining why recognition of a friend after hairstyle 
change is easy, in contrast to changes in someone 
encountered less frequently. SRs however, appear to ‘learn’ 
novel faces more effectively, extrapolating facial identity 
across different viewpoints after brief exposures [4]. As 
such, disguises covering different facial features may 
differentially effect identification by individuals differing in 
face recognition ability. This has policing implications, as 
beliefs that disguised face image identification is impossible 
may be made at early investigative stages by someone with 
‘average ability’, leading to case closure, when in fact 
identification by SRs might be possible.  
To investigate this, in Experiment 1, SRs and ‘average-
ability’ controls, completed a 40-trial Disguised Face 
Memory Test, in which a single target face in no disguise, 
sunglasses, hat and plaster, or balaclava, was followed by an 
array of 10 undisguised faces. The disguises were suggested 
by police as exemplars of recent cases. In Experiment 2, 
SRs and controls viewed a 1 min target video in similar 
disguise conditions, and at least one week later viewed a 
video line-up. In both experiments, in half the trials the 
target was present (TP), half were target-absent (TA). 
Correct target identifications in TP trials were categorised as 
hits. Correct TA trial responses in were categorised as 
correct rejections (CR). Here, participants correctly 
identified the target as absent from the array/line-up.  
To hypothesise, SRs were predicted to outperform 
controls on all outcomes. Disguises, particularly the 
balaclava as it covered most of the face, were expected to 
reduce accuracy, and in Experiment 2, longer delays were 
expected to additionally impact accuracy [see 17]. However, 
the sunglasses, and the hat and plaster only partly obscured 
internal, or external facial features; and therefore no specific 
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predictions were made as to the relative impact of these 
disguises on SR and control TP or TA accuracy.  
 
2. Experiment 1 
 
 
2.1 Method 
 
2.1.1 Design 
 
A 2 (independent measures: Group: SR, control) x 4 
(repeated measures: Disguise: no disguise, sunglasses, hat 
and plaster, balaclava) x 2 (repeated measures: target 
presence: target present: TP, target absent: TA) mixed 
design was employed. The dependent variables were TP 
trial hits (rates of correct target identifications), and correct 
rejections (CR; rates of correctly responding the target was 
not present) of TA trials.  
 
2.1.2 Participants 
 
Participants had contributed to the first author’s previous 
unpublished research, and had volunteered for more. Those 
meeting SR and control criteria were invited by e-mail to 
take the online Qualtrics platform tests. 1 Most previous SR 
research has employed the Cambridge Face Memory Test: 
Extended (CFMT+) [7], with a minimum SR threshold of 
90/102 (2 SD above the mean) (= top 2%) [e.g., 1-3, 6]. 
However, a recently recommended higher criterion was used 
here (min = 95/102) [see 18] for SRs (n = 106, 66.0% 
female; 82.1% white; aged 18 - 63; M = 35.7; SD = 10.1). 
Controls (n = 101, 51.5% female; 89.2% white; aged 18 - 
72; M = 43.4; SD = 13.4) had scored within 1 SD (83.0 – 
58.4) of the estimated population mean (CFMT+: M = 70.7, 
SD = 12.3 [see 18]).  
As expected, SR’s CFMT+ scores (M = 96.4, SD = 1.3) 
were higher than controls (M = 73.6, SD = 4.8), t(205) = 
47.04, p < .001, Cohen’s d = 6.48. Unexpectedly, SRs were 
also younger, t(204) = 4.66, p = .003; and mainly female, 
χ2(1, 201) = 6.31, p = .012. 
 
2.1.3 Materials and procedure 
 
Disguised Face Memory Test [DFMT; adapted from 
12]: Before starting, participants provided consent, and were 
correctly informed that some faces would be in disguise, and 
that half the trials would be TA. Participants attempted to 
familiarise themselves to a series of 40 single video stills of 
a white male target face for 8-sec in one of four disguise 
conditions (see Fig. 1). They almost immediately attempted 
to identify the target from an array of 10 white male 
undisguised faces. Participants clicked on a number 
associated with each face (1-10) or responded ‘not present’, 
and gave a decision confidence rating (0: guessing-100: 
highly confident). All images were high-quality, taken on 
                                                          
1 www.qualtrics.com 
the same day and half the arrays contained a frontal facial 
photograph of the target within an array of nine foils (TP), 
or with the target replaced by an extra foil (TA). Each array 
had been constructed by selecting target-similar faces from a 
database of 200 trainee police officers. Disguises were 
added using GIMP software. 2 Each disguise was shown to 
each participant in Stage 1 an equal number of times: TP = 5 
trials in each disguise condition; TA = 5 trials in each 
disguise condition). After completing two practice trials, 
this test consisted of 40 trials with stimuli randomly ordered 
and fully counterbalanced across 8 versions.  
Hit rates were defined as the proportion of correct TP 
identifications in each disguise condition (out of 5). CR 
rates were the proportion of CRs in each disguise condition 
in TA trials (out of 5). Mean decision confidence rates in 
each condition were also calculated.  
      
       
 
Fig. 1: Examples of artificially edited disguises in 
Experiment 1, clockwise from top left: no disguise; 
sunglasses; balaclava; hat and plaster (for copyright 
reasons original images from [13] are not depicted) 
 
2.2 Results 
 
A series of 2 (group: SR, control) x 4 (disguise: no 
disguise; sunglasses; hat and plaster; balaclava) mixed 
ANOVAs were conducted on each outcome (hits, CRs, 
confidence). Post-hoc comparisons were performed using 
the Bonferroni correction (p < .05). Where appropriate the 
Greenhouse-Geisser adjustment was applied to violations of 
sphericity. Occasional missing data (confidence) were 
treated as such on specific analyses only.  
Accuracy (hits and CRs) (see Figs. 2,a-b): There were 
significant effects of group on hits, F(1, 205) = 16.76, p < 
.001, 2 = .076; and CRs, F(1, 205) = 32.43, p < .001, 2 = 
.137. SRs outperformed controls on both accuracy measures, 
although CR rate effect sizes were stronger. 
                                                          
2 https://www.gimp.org (Version 2.8) 
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There were significant effects of disguise on hits, 
F(2.87, 588.91) = 90.67, p < .001, 2 = .307; and CRs, 
F(2.87, 587.50) = 51.54, p < .001, 2 = .200. Post-hoc 
paired comparisons found that hits and CRs were highest in 
the no disguise condition, followed successively and 
significantly by the hat and plaster, sunglasses, and 
balaclava condition respectively (all p’s < .05). 
 
 
Fig 2. a) Mean hits (proportions); b) CRs (proportions); c) 
confidence on the DFRT (ND = no disguise; SG = sunglasses; HP 
= hat and plaster; BA = balaclava) separately for SRs (black bars) 
and controls (grey bars) in Experiment 1 (error bars = standard 
error of the mean: SEM) 
Mean confidence (Fig. 2c): A 2 (group) x 4 (disguise) x 
2 (condition: TP, TA) ANOVA revealed significant main 
effects of group, F(1, 142) = 24.93, p < .001, 2 = .149; 
SR’s were more confident than controls; disguise, F(2.77, 
392.62) = 57.49, p < .001, 2 = .288; confidence was 
significantly highest in the no disguise condition, followed 
by the hat and plaster, sunglasses, and balaclava  condition 
respectively (all p’s < .05); and presence, F(1, 142) = 8.08, 
p = .005, 2 = .054; confidence was higher in TP trials.  
There was a disguise x presence interaction, F(2.72, 
386.73) = 12.77, p < .001, 2 = .083. In TP trials, confidence 
was highest in the no disguise condition and lowest in the 
balaclava condition (p < .001); there were no significant 
differences between the sunglasses, and the hat and plaster 
conditions (p > .2). With TA trials, confidence was highest 
in the no disguise condition, followed by the hat and plaster 
condition (p < .05); there were no significant differences 
between the sunglasses and the balaclava conditions (p > 
.05). The other interactions were not significant (p > .05).  
 
2.3 Experiment 1 Discussion 
 
On all outcomes, and regardless of disguise or target 
presence in Experiment 1, SRs outperformed controls and 
were also more confident. As first phase exposure time was 
only 8-sec, these findings are consistent with research 
demonstrating that SRs are more accurate at learning and 
identifying novel faces, and at ruling out faces not been seen 
before – skills that may draw on different memorial 
processes. Accuracy and confidence in all participants was 
adversely affected by disguise, with those covering the 
external features or the eyes impacting most (balaclava 
followed by sunglasses), supporting research suggesting that 
external features drive unfamiliar face recognition, and the 
eyes and internal features are more important as faces 
become familiarised [16]. Nevertheless, even in the hardest 
balaclava condition, hit rates in TP trials were well above 
chance levels (chance = 1/10 = 0.10) by both SRs (0.48) and 
controls (0.42). The implications are discussed below. 
However, the stimuli used in Experiment 1 had all been 
taken on the same day, were artificially disguised, and the 
delay between Stages 1 and 2 was brief. Most police 
investigations involve images taken at different times and 
recognition is normally required after longer delays. 
Experiment 2 addressed these issues.  
 
3. Experiment 2 
 
3.1 Method 
 
3.1.1 Design 
 
Participants viewed a target video in a disguise 
condition in Stage 1. At least one week later in Stage 2, they 
viewed a video line-up in a 2 (Group: SR, control) x 4 
(Disguise: no disguise, sunglasses, hat and plaster, 
balaclava) x 2 (Presence: TP, TA) mixed design. The 
dependent variables were hits in TP conditions, and CRs in 
TA conditions. Confidence and delay were also analysed.  
 
3.1.2 Participants 
 
Participants were recruited in the same manner as 
Experiment 1. Of the participants who completed Stage 1, 
Fig. 2a: Hit rates (mean proportion correct in TP trials) 
Fig. 2b: CR rates (mean proportion correct in TA trials) 
Fig. 2c: Mean confidence 
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more controls than SRs failed to contribute to Stage 2 (drop 
outs: SRs = 30 out of 99 Stage 1 starters: 30.3%; controls = 
78 out of 143: 54.5%), χ2(1, 242) = 13.91, p < .001, ɸ = 
.240. However, Stage 1 disguise condition had no impact on 
whether participants completed Stage 2 or not (p > .2).  
Participants who completed Stage 2 were SRs (n = 69, 
53.6% female; 78.3% white; aged 19-61; M = 33.7 years; 
SD = 9.7) and controls (n = 65, 50.8% female; 83.1% white; 
aged 18 - 65; M = 36.4 years; SD = 14.6).  
SRs scored significantly higher on the CFMT+ (M = 
96.3, SD = 1.3) than controls (M = 74.7, SD = 5.6), t(132) = 
31.21, p < .001, Cohen’s d = 5.34. Unlike Experiment 1, 
there were no differences in age, t(124) = 1.23, p > .2; or 
gender proportions, χ2(1, 132) < 1. 
 
3.1.3 Materials 
 
Video stimuli (Stage 1): The single target was filmed in 
four 10-sec colour video clips wearing no disguise, 
sunglasses, hat and plaster, or balaclava (see Fig. 3). In each 
clip, he faces the camera, turns right, forward, left, then 
faces the camera again. The video was looped so that 
duration of each final video was one minute.  
Video line-ups (Stage 2): Four PROMAT 3 video line-
ups were created (two TP and two TA to vary target and foil 
order – this had no effects, p > .2) by a police officer, 
following legal codes of practice in England and Wales [19]. 
High target-similarity foils were visually selected from a 
short list after entering keywords matching the target’s 
description (e.g., age, gender) into a database. Each line-up 
consists of nine 15-sec sequentially presented colour head-
and-shoulders video clips. Members face the camera; look 
left, right and forward. TP videos contained the target and 
eight foils; TA clips nine foils. The sequence repeats twice, 
with line-up numbers displayed (see [20] for a video of the 
procedure). There was a delay of 12 months between 
filming the target videos for Stage 1 and 2.  
 
    
 
Fig. 3. Stills from the Experiment 2 Stage 1 videos depicting 
the target in each disguise condition (from left: no disguise, 
sunglasses, hat and plaster, balaclava) 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
3 Promat Envision International, Nelson, Lancashire, UK 
3.1.4 Procedure 
 
In Stage 1, participants viewed one of the randomly 
assigned 1-min target videos and recorded their confidence 
in being likely to later recognise the suspect (0: highly 
unlikely-100: very likely). An e-mail invite was sent one 
week later for Stage 2, during which participants were 
warned that the suspect ‘may or may not be present’, and 
were randomly assigned to view a password protected TP or 
TA video line-up. They then selected a number associated 
with each line-up member (1-9) which corresponded to the 
target identity in the line-up if present or rejected the line-up 
if absent, and provided confidence (0: guessing-100: 
absolutely certain). Hit, CR and confidence measures were 
calculated in the same manner as in Experiment 1, except 
participants made a single identification decision only. 
 
3.2 Results 
 
The mean delay between Stage 1 and 2 was 10.3 days 
(SD = 12.3). Delay for SRs and controls did not differ, 
t(132) = 1.43, p = .155. For all participants, regardless of 
disguise or target presence, there was no correlation 
between CFMT+ scores and Stage 1 confidence, r(131) = 
0.14, p = .116. However CFMT+ scores and Stage 1 
confidence correlated with Stage 2 accuracy, r CFMT+(134) = 
0.33, p < .001; r Stage 1 conf (129) = 0.29, p = .001; and 
confidence, r CFMT+(129) = 0.27, p = .002; r Stage 1 conf (127) = 
0.34, p < .001.  
 
 
Fig 4. a) Mean hits (proportions); b) CRs (proportions) in 
Experiment 2 (ND = no disguise; SG = sunglasses; HP = hat and 
plaster; BA = balaclava) separately for SRs (black bars) and 
controls (grey bars) (error bars = SEM) 
Fig. 4b: CR rates in TA trials 
Fig. 4a: Hit rates in TP trials 
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Fig. 4a-b displays the mean hit and CR rates in each 
disguise condition for SRs and controls. 
Accuracy: Due to low expected counts in some 
conditions violating statistical assumptions of a three-way 
loglinear analyses, it was not possible to combine group and 
disguise conditions into single analyses in TP and TA 
conditions. Therefore two separate sets of analyses were 
conducted to increase statistical power.  
In the first, TP and TA trials were combined, and a 
series of 2 (group) x 2 (accuracy: correct, incorrect) chi-
squared tests found that SRs were more accurate than 
controls in the no disguise, χ2(1, 29) = 4.55, p = .033, ɸ = 
.396; hat and plasters, χ2(1, 26) = 8.33, p = .004, ɸ = .566; 
and balaclava conditions, χ2(1, 24) = 4.20, p = .040, ɸ = 
.418; but not the sunglasses condition, χ2(1, 55) = 1.21, p = 
.271, ɸ = .149.  
For the second analysis, the SR and control data were 
pooled, and a 4 (disguise) x 2 (accuracy) chi-squared test 
was also significant, χ2(3, 134) = 11.00, p = .012, ɸ = .287. 
The only significant post doc test was that accuracy in the 
balaclava condition was lower than the other three 
conditions (p < .05), which did not differ (p > .05).  
 
 
Fig 4. c) Mean confidence in Experiment 2 (ND = no disguise; SG 
= sunglasses; HP = hat and plaster; BA = balaclava) separately 
for SRs (black bars) and controls (grey bars) (error bars = SEM) 
Confidence: A 2 (group) x 4 (disguise) x 2 (target 
presence) ANOVA conducted on confidence found a 
significant group effect, F(1, 113) = 8.75, p = .004, 2 = 
.072; SRs were more confident than controls. The disguise 
main effect was significant, F(3, 113) = 2.84, p = .041, 2 = 
.070; The only significant post-hoc comparison was that 
confidence in the no disguise condition was higher than the 
sunglasses condition (p < .05). The target presence main 
effect and all interactions were not significant (p > .15).  
Delay: There was no significant correlation between 
delay and accuracy although the effects were in the expected 
negative direction, r(134) = -.14, p = .101.  
 
3.3 Experiment 2 Discussion 
 
As with Experiment 1 and expectations, SRs 
outperformed controls in three of the four disguise 
conditions (no disguise, hat and plaster, balaclava). The only 
non-significant comparison was in the sunglasses condition, 
mainly because the controls unexpectedly had the highest 
rates of accuracy in that condition. However, even when 
combined with the SR data, the accuracy rates in the 
sunglasses condition did not significantly differ from 
accuracy in the no disguise or hat and plasters conditions. 
Nevertheless, consistent with Experiment 1, accuracy in the 
balaclava condition was significantly worse than in the other 
three conditions, although rates of correct target 
identifications by SRs (0.63) and controls (0.30) in TP 
conditions were again above chance despite a delay of at 
least one week (chance = 1/9 = 0.11). 
SRs were also more confident than controls in all 
disguise conditions, although unexpectedly, the only 
significant disguise effect was that confidence was highest 
in the no disguise condition, and lowest in the sunglasses 
condition.  
It is noteworthy however, that rates of correct line-up 
rejections in the TA no disguise and sunglasses conditions 
were at, or close to ceiling by both groups, and SR’s CR 
rates were additionally at ceiling in the hat and plasters 
condition, suggesting a bias to (correctly) respond not 
present under conditions of uncertainty. However, it is 
important to note that the conclusions from this experiment 
may be limited as all participants were exposed to the same 
target individual in Stage 1, and each encountered only one 
trial. Further research is required to examine whether effects 
would generalise to other actors (and gender, ethnicity etc.).  
 
4. General Discussion and Conclusions 
 
Previous research has shown that SRs possess superior 
abilities at short-term unfamiliar face recognition [e.g. 1, 7], 
simultaneous unfamiliar face matching [2, 8], recognising 
distorted 15-year-old famous face images [4] and spotting a 
face in a crowd [5]. The current research was the first to 
demonstrate that this advantage transfers to immediate and 
delayed (one-week) recognition of unfamiliar disguised 
faces. In both experiments, using a robust threshold for SR 
group membership, regardless of disguise condition, SRs 
outperformed ‘average-ability’ controls, and expressed 
higher confidence in their decisions. Although not all effects 
were significant in Experiment 2, mainly due to low 
statistical power, the pattern of disguise results was similar 
to Experiment 1, supporting theories suggesting that 
disguise covering external features is most detrimental to 
unfamiliar face recognition [16] regardless of ability. 
Identification accuracy was slightly reduced by wearing 
a hat and plaster (a possible tactic used to avoid detection by 
face recognition algorithms). However, internal features, 
particularly eyes, are the most important for face 
familiarisation [21] and may negatively impact face learning 
as sunglasses covering the eyes reduced performance more. 
Nevertheless, the strongest reductions in identification 
accuracy and confidence were when targets wore balaclavas 
covering almost all of the face but the eyes (Figs. 1, 3), and 
yet even in this condition, SRs and controls were far more 
Fig. 4c: Mean confidence 
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accurate than chance levels alone. After a week, SRs were 
twice as likely as controls to be correct in this condition. 
There are implications here for computer scientists 
testing face recognition algorithms, or systems to assist 
police review CCTV footage [e.g. 22]. Most research testing 
algorithms employs ‘average’ ability humans as controls 
[23]. These algorithms surpass average-ability humans with 
high and medium quality footage, although humans 
outperform the top systems with lower quality footage - 
which is common with much CCTV evidence. However, it 
is not clear whether the same conclusions would be made 
when comparing computer systems with SRs.   
There are some limitations to this research. Most 
suspect identifications from CCTV are made by those 
familiar with suspects, and images may be of lower quality 
than those used here. Even though SRs may be more 
accurate than controls at unfamiliar face recognition of 
heavily disguised faces, performance was not at 100%, and 
if giving identification evidence in court, the risks of error 
should be acknowledged. Nevertheless, it is very clear that 
the effective deployment of SRs in police forces worldwide 
should have a positive impact on crime detection and 
homeland security.  
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